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The German population has good financial knowledge measured on the basis of three finan-
cial literacy questions. Around 85 % of the individuals comprehend the functioning of interest 
and inflation. And 60 % of the individuals understand the relationship of risk and diversifica-
tion. Overall around 52 % of the individuals give correct answers to all three considered ques-
tions of financial literacy. Bi-variate and multivariate analyses of the relation between giving 
three correct answers and socio-demographic characteristics reveal that higher wealth is asso-
ciated with higher levels of financial literacy. Moreover, financial literacy relates to higher 
levels of income and education. There is a significant difference between men and women to 
give three correct answers. Individuals in East and West, are equally literate, when control-
ling for differences in income, wealth and education. 
A positive correlation of financial literacy and financial decision making is identified: more 
literate households are more likely to save privately for their old-age and at the same time 
households saving privately for their old-age acquire financial knowledge to improve their 
investment decisions. Interestingly, the possession of a state subsidised Riester contract is 
related to lower levels of financial literacy than the possession of other non-subsidised forms 
of private old-age provision. This indicates that Riester subsidies to some extent successfully 
encourage individuals with lower financial knowledge to save for old-age. Nevertheless, indi-
viduals in the lowest income quintile still have very low levels of private coverage despite the 
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1.  Introduction 
Private old-age provision is growing increasingly important in times of demo-
graphic change and mounting strains on the public pension system. Major pension 
reforms were implemented in Germany in 2001, 2004 and 2007.
1 Currently about 
85% of the German work force is covered by the German public pension insurance. 
According to Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2006) about 88% of total disposable old-age 
income in Germany is disbursed from the public pension system. After the recent re-
forms these payments will decrease dramatically and individuals are expected to ac-
cumulate substantial amounts of pension wealth in addition to their claims from the 
public pension system to bridge the gap that arises in old-age income (Wilke, 2009). 
In order to provide additional incentives for private old-age savings in 2001 the so-
called Riester-pensions - state subsidised private pension or savings contracts - were 
introduced.
2 According to BMAS (2009) currently about 12.9 Mio. contracts are reg-
istered. In contrast to private (third pillar) retirement savings in the Netherlands and 
Sweden, Riester contracts are voluntary supplementary pensions.  
For many individuals in Germany the “need” to save for old-age in addition to the 
state pension is new and households seem to face difficulties saving for old age due to 
the high complexity and the large variety of old-age savings contracts. In order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of governmental programs it is vital to examine who takes 
care of their old-age income and signs a Riester or other private old-age savings con-
tract and who does not. One important dimension along which individuals may differ 
is their level of erudition as investors. In the light of increasing individual responsibil-
ity and potential public measures such as targeted information and education pro-
grams it is therefore important to better understand the link between their financial 
knowledge and financial decision-making. The OECD (2005) defines financial educa-
tion as  
“the process by which financial consumers/investors improve their understanding 
of financial products and concepts through information, instruction, and/or ob-
jective advice, develop the skills and confidence to become more aware of finan-
cial risks and opportunities to make informed choices, to know where to go for 
help, and to take effective actions to improve their financial well-being.” 
                                                 
1 See Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) for details of the reform until 2004 and Bucher-Koenen and 
Wilke (2009) for effects of the reform in 2007. 
2 For institutional details and empirical evidence on the Riester pensions see Börsch-Supan, et al. 
(2007).   4 
Better financial education leads to more financially literate individuals. Thus, fi-
nancial literacy is a very comprehensive concept, which includes knowledge as well 
as capabilities. In the course of my analysis I will concentrate on the “knowledge” 
aspect within the broader financial literacy concept. However, knowledge in the con-
text of decision making is partly experience driven. The kind of knowledge required 
for financial decisions is highly context specific and hard to determine in general.
3 
For simple every day financial decisions basic verbal and numeric abilities are suffi-
cient. The more complex a decision, the more specific the knowledge about available 
alternatives, risks and the possible outcomes has to be. Much research has been con-
ducted on ways to measure financial literacy, pioneered primarily by Annamaria Lu-
sardi and Olivia Mitchell. Their stepping stone was the development of three ques-
tions testing the understanding of inflation, interest and risk. These questions have 
been included in various surveys around the world and allow for some comparison of 
financial knowledge across countries (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009, 2006). They are 
also part of the SAVE survey and form the basis for my analysis. 
Studies of financial literacy in the US and the Netherlands found that in particular 
low income/low education households and women are at risk of lacking financial lit-
eracy and thus accumulate low retirement wealth (see e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2006), van Rooji, Lusardi and Alessi (2007)). Riester pensions could address these 
issues, as they were designed to be especially beneficial to households with low in-
come and households with children, yet the interaction with financial literacy has not 
been studied up until now. The questions arising are therefore along the following 
lines: How financially literate are individuals with a Riester compared to individuals 
with other private old-age savings and compared to households without any private 
provision? Are higher levels of financial literacy associated with more private pension 
coverage? Are these effects more or less pronounced for households with lower in-
come? 
My study contributes to the existing literature by addressing these questions us-
ing survey data from a representative sample of German households. I analyze the 
socio-demographic factors related to financial knowledge with the goal of gaining 
insights into the link of this knowledge to financial old-age provision. Several other 
studies found that the level of financial literacy among the German population is lim-
ited (e.g., Commerzbank (2003), Leinert and Wagner (2004), Raffelhüschen and Vic-
                                                 
3 For a more detailed psychological examination of the different constructs relevant in the context of 
financial literacy see Bothe-Hutschenreuter (2007). The author finds that besides maximum behaviour 
(financial knowledge) typical reponse (motivation) and life data have an important effect on old-age 
provision. Bothe-Hutschenreuter differentiates between declarative financial knowledge, scenario-
based financial knowledge, understanding of economic principles like the effects of interest, compound 
interest and risk, cognitive abilities like numeracy and self-assessed financial knowledge.   5
toria Lebensversicherung (2006) , Deutscher Bankenverband (2008)). However these 
studies largely failed to link financial knowledge to financial decision making of indi-
viduals. SAVE gives me the unique opportunity to fill this gap. 
The remainder of this analysis is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and discusses potential ways to measure finan-
cial knowledge. Section 4 includes the empirical analysis and attempts to shed light 
on the central questions raised above. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Literature 
2.1.  Existing work on life-cycle savings 
When analysing old-age provision one usually draws on the classical life-cycle 
savings theory by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). The central outcome of their 
model is that as a result of optimization-behavior individuals smooth their income and 
consumption path over the life-cycle (life-cycle savings hypothesis). To compensate 
for income-losses at old-age forward-looking individuals should accumulate capital at 
younger ages. Thus, taking their current information into account individuals calcu-
late an expected value of the future development of their income, their survival prob-
ability, the discount rates, the interest rate, their investments, the pension claims and 
the inflation and formulate their optimal consumption and savings plan on these 
grounds (Lusardi, 2008a). 
However, empirical contributions find that individuals’ savings patterns are sub-
stantially different from the predictions of the classical life-cycle savings theory. For 
example in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, France, the UK and the US savings rates 
are found to be positive at all ages, thus older households do not decumulate wealth as 
predicted by the life-cycle savings theory (Börsch-Supan, 2001).
4 Other savings mo-
tives like precautionary saving or bequest motives were subsequently included to im-
prove the model’s predictive power.
5 
Behavioral Economics emerged mainly in the 1970s and 1980s and attempts to 
capture behaviour of boundedly rational agents. It substantially extends the under-
standing of individuals’ decision making, in particular savings behaviour, by admit-
                                                 
4 See results of the International Savings Comparison Project (Special issues of „Research in Econom-
ics“: Vol. 55(1+2), 2001).  
5 For a review on household savings see Browning and Lusardi (1996).   6 
ting that individuals are limited in their capacity to make rational decisions and devi-
ate systematically and predictably from rational behavior. Central contributions in this 
respect are by Strotz (1956), Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as 
well as contributions by Thaler (1981) and Thaler and Shefrin (1981). Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988) formulate a „Behavioral Life-cycle Hypothesis” assuming boundedly 
rational agents in the sense that individuals face problems with self-control, mental 
accounting and framing. Due to limited cognitive abilities individuals use simple rules 
of thumb in order to make their life-cycle savings decisions and arrive at second best 
solutions compared to traditional theory. Thaler (1994) criticises life-cycle savings 
theory and proposes three behavioral extensions to better describe actual saving be-
haviour and to derive useful policy recommendations to encourage savings. However, 
in spite of the extensive criticism and empirical dismissal the life-cycle hypothesis 
still forms the major theory of saving and substantially influences the thinking of ec-
onomists and public policy makers.  
Given that real individuals are indeed boundedly rational in an economic sense 
there are most probably differences in the degree of boundedness. On the one side of 
the spectrum individuals that are more rational and less biased may make sound fi-
nancial decisions, on the other side of the spectrum individuals that are less rational 
and more biased make large mistakes. For example Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro 
(2006) find that the “(ir)rationality” (small-stakes risk aversion and short-run dis-
counting) of individuals is related to their cognitive abilities. In measuring financial 
literacy economists try to determine the differences in financial knowledge and capa-
bilities of individuals and relate these to their financial decision-making. The overall 
aim is to identify the individuals at risk of making bad decisions and tailor policy 
programs specifically to their needs. 
There are few studies that explicitly consider financial literacy in a theoretical con-
text. Maki (2004) argues relatively informally that financial education does not 
change preference parameters of individuals (risk and time preferences) but alters the 
choice set that individuals face when planning for the future. Thus, financial educa-
tion increases individuals’ awareness of possible ways to save for future consumption 
and thereby improves their decisions. Delavande et al. (2008) argue on similar 
grounds and assume that individuals are limited in their ability to optimize consump-
tion and savings over the life-cycle due to restrictions in information access and in-
formation processing. However, individuals can improve their optimization abilities 
by acquiring financial knowledge, which is modelled as human capital production 
process. Peress (2004) explains the different pattern of stock holding and wealth by 
endogenous differences in information. He assumes that financial information about   7
stocks is costly, however its value for the individual increases with the amount to be 
invested in stocks. Thus, individuals, with more money to invest, buy information and 
invest more in stocks because the investment is less risky for them. Thereby they ac-
cumulate further wealth.  
The feature common to all models of financial literacy acquisition is that informa-
tion about financial investment opportunities is costly and individuals can acquire 
knowledge. However, they face different constraints when acquiring financial knowl-
edge depending on for example the level of experience/human capital investment 
(Delavande, et al., 2008), wealth (Peress, 2004), cognitive abilities (Christelis, et al., 
2006). In general, financial literacy and financial decision-making are mutually en-
hancing: The more an individual knows about different options and consequences the 
better her financial decisions will be. And at the same time the more decisions the 
individual makes the more knowledge she can acquire. Analogously, the more impor-
tant saving is for an individual the higher is the incentive to acquire knowledge and, 
vice versa, the more an individual knows about finance the more likely she might be 
to save.  
Besides the direct impact of financial education on financial decisions there poten-
tially is a relation between financial knowledge and preference parameters (time and 
risk preferences). While Maki (2004) argues that financial literacy does not alter time 
and risk preferences, indirect links may exist. More patient individuals, i.e. individu-
als with lower discount rates, might for example be more willing to save for future 
consumption and at the same time be more willing to invest in education. Further-
more, the link may well be via cognitive abilities: Christelis et al. (2006) suggest that 
cognitive abilities reduce the effort to acquire and process information and at the 
same time increases risk tolerance and therefore people with higher cognition are 
more likely to invest in the stock market.
6  
Hypotheses 
Thus, with respect to socio-demographic characteristics and financial literacy the 
following four hypotheses can be derived:  
•  Hypothesis 1: As the incentives to invest in financial knowledge increase with 
wealth, I expect the level of financial literacy to be higher for individuals with 
higher wealth. 
                                                 
6 For details on the effects of cognitive abilities on decision making competences in general, see for 
example Ballinger, et al. (2007), Benjamin, et al. (2006), Bruine de Bruin, et al. (2007).   8 
•  Hypothesis 2:  I expect that individuals with personal characteristics that 
lower the cost of financial literacy acquisition, for example higher education, 
higher income and wealth, show superior levels of financial literacy.  
•  Hypothesis 3: Moreover, I expect to find lower levels of financial literacy in 
East Germany compared to West Germany as individuals socialised in the 
GDR are expected to have less experience with individual financial decision 
making. The differences should be smaller for younger individuals.  
•  Hypothesis 4: In addition, I expect to find an inverted U-shaped pattern of fi-
nancial literacy over age. This pattern is expected to arise from the trade-off 
between increasing experience and declining cognitive abilities over age.  
2.2.  Financial literacy and financial decision making - empiri-
cal evidence 
Empirical studies document high levels of financial illiteracy among individuals in 
many countries. In the US one of the first studies on financial knowledge was con-
ducted by Bernheim (1998). He finds a low level of financial literacy among large 
parts of the US population. The results are confirmed among others by Hilgert and 
Hogarth (2002) as well as Moore (2003) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2006).
7  
The evidence on financial literacy in other countries is more limited.  A report by 
the OECD (2005) documents low levels of financial literacy in Australia, the US, the 
UK, Japan and Korea. The ANZ Survey (2005) finds low levels of financial literacy 
for Australia and New Zealand and Atkinson et al. (2007) raise concerns about the 
low level of financial literacy in the UK. Van Rooji et al. (2007) examine the levels of 
financial literacy in the Netherlands and Monticone (2009) documents low financial 
literacy in the Italian population. Within all countries the subpopulations with the 
lowest literacy levels are those with low income, low educational degrees, women and 
minorities. Some studies find hump-shaped age-profiles indicating that financial liter-
acy is highest among the middle-aged.  
For Germany, studies by Commerzbank (2003), Leinert (2004), Leinert and Wag-
ner (2004) as well as a study by the Deutsche Bankenverband (2008) document low 
levels of financial literacy. The Commerzbank (2003) study identifies low financial 
knowledge in particular among the young, less educated individuals with lower in-
comes and among women.  They identify particular deficits of knowledge about fi-
nancial investments, basic economic knowledge and private provision. Leinert (2004) 
and Leinert and Wagner (2004) analyse financial literacy of German individuals aged 
                                                 
7 Lusardi (2008a) provides an overview of different studies.   9
30-50 and find that individuals substantially overestimate the long-term effect of in-
flation
8 as well as the pension income of an average income earner after 30 years of 
contributions. Knowledge with respect to the risk, return and cost of specific products 
is also limited. Groups at risk are individuals with lower income and lower educa-
tional levels. The study of the Deutsche Bankenverband (2008) finds that in particular 
young women, individuals with a low schooling degree and individuals from East 
Germany have lower levels of financial competences (measured as the interest in eco-
nomics and personal financial issues).  
Financial literacy is of particular interest if analysed in a context of financial deci-
sion-making. Hilgert, et al. (2003) report a generally positive relation between finan-
cial literacy and financial behaviour with respect to cash-flow and credit management, 
saving and investment behavior. Leinert and Wagner (2004) identify that persons with 
the lowest financial literacy have difficulties dealing with financial matters. They feel 
unsure about their decisions and put financial decisions off. Thus, the least knowl-
edgeable spend less time thinking about financial issues and are more likely to decide 
quickly without considering the consequences or possible alternatives. Similarly, Ag-
new and Szykman (2005) find experimental evidence that individuals with low finan-
cial knowledge select the default pension plan significantly more frequently than so-
phisticated individuals. 
Other studies analyze financial literacy in connection with specific investment de-
cisions: Financial knowledge has an important effect on old-age planning and thereby 
on the accumulation of wealth (Lusardi und Mitchell 2006, 2007a and b).  Further-
more, Lusardi und Mitchell (2006), van Rooji, Lusardi und Alessi (2007) as well as 
Christelis et al. (2006) discover that individuals with less financial knowledge have 
fewer risky assets in their portfolio. Bertaut (1998) finds that individuals with charac-
teristics associated with lower cost of information processing (high education, low 
risk aversion, greater wealth) are more likely to enter the stock market. Campbell 
(2006) argues along the same lines: Individuals with lower knowledge may face 
higher fixed cost of participation in the stock market or anticipate that their portfolio 
choice would be less efficient and thus stay out of risky assets. According to Calvet et 
al. (2006) more educated, wealthier households with higher income tend to invest 
more aggressively and at the same time more efficiently. They face only moderate 
losses due to under-diversification of their portfolios. Calvet et al. (2009) construct an 
index of financial sophistication on the basis of Swedish household portfolios taking 
the following three investment mistakes into account: underdiversification, risky 
share inertia and a disposition effect. According to their study, these investment mis-
                                                 
8 However, the impact of inflation on the purchasing power was mentioned in the question.   10 
takes decrease with wealth and household size as well as with education and financial 
experience. They also identify a strong positive correlation between the share of risky 
assets held in the portfolio and financial sophistication (as measured by the probabil-
ity to make one of the three mistakes). Barasinska et al. (2008) discover that most 
German households do not diversify their portfolios sufficiently and invest very con-
servatively. They argue that lack of financial literacy is a cause for not tapping the full 
potential of diversification and financial literacy of individuals should be improved. 
In addition to these analyses of the link between financial literacy, wealth accumu-
lation and portfolio choice, there are a number of studies that examine the link be-
tween financial literacy and investment mistakes. According to Lusardi and Tufano 
(2009) individuals who know less about the effects of compound interest are more 
likely to report excessive debt. Campbell (2006) finds that financially sophisticated 
households are more likely to refinance mortgages when this is beneficial. Less edu-
cated households are much more likely to report implausibly low mortgage rates and 
may therefore fail to refinance. Müller and Weber (2008) discover that financially 
sophisticated investors are less biased towards past returns, pay lower front-end loads 
and less frequently miss-calibrate forecasts for their own as well as the general stock 
market development. They detect a minor influence of financial literacy on buying 
passively vs. actively managed funds. 
A study by the OECD (2008) summarizes the effects of low financial literacy on 
the decision to annuitize, i.e. to insure against longevity risk and indicates that less 
literate individuals might be less likely to insure against longevity risk. 
If individuals with low financial literacy know about their lack of knowledge they 
should contact experts. However, the problem is that individuals who know little have 
limited abilities to judge the quality of the advice given and face a classical principal-
agent problem. Studies examining the link between financial literacy and financial 
advice find that more knowledgeable individuals tend to be matched with financial 
advisors more frequently (Hackethal, et al., 2009). Individuals with lower financial 
knowledge tend to rely upon informal sources of information more often (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2007b, Van Rooji, et al., 2007). 
Another way out of low financial literacy would be financial education. However, 
the evidence regarding the effect of financial education programs is mixed.
9 Never-
theless, economists have advocated the enhancement of financial knowledge for al-
most two decades now. Kotlikoff (1992) started to argue for an increase in financial 
information about savings and retirement income to increase individuals’ attention to 
                                                 
9 For a review see Braunstein and Welch (2002) and Lusardi (2008b).   11
retirement savings and raise savings rates. Bernheim (1997a, 1997b) discusses differ-
ent policy options to stimulate savings in particular of US baby boomers. In addition 
to tax incentives education and promotional activities play a central role in promoting 
savings. Kotz and Weber (2007) also see the lack of financial knowledge as an impor-
tant policy issue and argue how finance can contribute to effectively enhance con-
sumers’ abilities. More sovereign consumers make better individual decision and 
therefore increase long-term well-being directly. In addition individuals become more 
competent judges both in their own as well as in the public interest which contributes 
to stabilizing financial markets by limiting mistakes of financial agents and decreas-
ing the need for regulation. Similarly, Campbell (2006) argues that low financial liter-
acy causes reluctance regarding financial innovations and high welfare costs. He con-
siders financial education, customer protection regulation, subsidies of suitable finan-
cial instruments, disclosure requirements and standard options (default offers) to be 
potential solutions to the problem. 
Given the evidence on financial literacy and old-age savings the expectation is that 
less literate individuals show lower levels of private pension coverage and thus lower 
levels of pension wealth. Yet, a potential countervailing factor exists for Germany. 
The German Pension Reform in 2001 introduced subsidized savings schemes, the so-
called Riester pensions to incentivize private savings. They were designed to be espe-
cially beneficial to households with low income and children. If financial incentives 
are successful they should to a certain degree compensate for low financial literacy. 
Thus, the following three questions arise:  
1.  Are higher levels of financial literacy associated with more private pension 
coverage?  
2.  How financially literate are individuals with a Riester compared to indi-
viduals with other private old-age savings and compared to households 
without any private provision?  
3.  Are these effects more or less pronounced for households with lower in-
come, who receive the highest subsidies?  
I will examine these aspects in section 4, after briefly introducing the data and meth-
odology used for this study.   12 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1.  SAVE 
SAVE is a representative German household panel designed to improve the under-
standing of savings behaviour. It was first conducted in 2001 by the Mannheim Re-
search Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). Consecutive waves were in the 
field in 2003/2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, as well as 2009. In 2008 there are 
2.608 households in the panel. The questionnaire is in paper and pencil format. A 
detailed description of the scientific background, design and results of the survey can 
be found in Börsch-Supan et al. (2008). I restrict my analysis to 1.241 households in 
the random route sample. The socio-demographic characteristics of the sample are 
provided in the annex. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) developed three basic questions 
on financial literacy that were included in SAVE 2008.  
3.2.  Measure of Financial Literacy 
The three questions on financial literacy were first developed by Lusardi and Mit-
chell for the HRS in 2004 (see Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) for the results). In the 
meantime the same questions could be included in several household surveys around 
the world. An extended module on financial literacy consisting of five questions on 
basic financial literacy and eleven questions on advanced financial literacy was in-
cluded in the household survey of the Dutch National Bank (Van Rooji, et al., 2007) 
and in the American Life Panel (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, 2009). A slightly modi-
fied version of the questions was also included in the Italian SHIW survey 
(Monticone, 2009).
10 
Two of the questions in this study are classified as measuring basic financial con-
cepts. The first question concerns the comprehension of interest and requires mainly 
the capacity to calculate. The second question examines the understanding of the joint 
effects of interest and inflation. The third question is categorised as measuring ad-
vanced financial knowledge and deals with risk and diversification. The exact word-
ing is as follows:  
1.  Understanding of Interest Rate (Numeracy) 
“Suppose you had 100€ in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per 
year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you 
left the money to grow: more than 102€, exactly 102€, less than 102€?” 
2.  Understanding of Inflation 
“Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and infla-
                                                 
10 See Lusardi (2008a) for an overview of these studies.   13
tion was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly 
the same as, or less than today with the money in this account?” 
3.  Understanding of Risk and Diversification 
“Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single com-
pany stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” 
 
In the following analysis I will use the fact if individuals were able to answer all three 
questions correctly as an indicator of financial literacy. 
4.  Results 
4.1.  How much do individuals know? 
I will first analyse the answers given to these questions separately before compil-
ing them to an index. Overall, a large fraction of German households answers the first 
two questions correctly: About 85% of the households know the correct answer to the 
interest question, and more than 86% answer the inflation question correctly. The 
interest question is answered incorrectly by more than 10% of the households, the 
inflation question by 8,5%. The fraction of missings is about 5% for both questions.  
The risk question is only answered correctly by 59% of the households and incor-
rectly by 3,6% of the households. However, here a “don’t know” option was given, 
which was selected by almost 35% of the households. The missing rate is about 2%. 
The difference in the refusals between the first two and the third question indicates 
that the majority of the missings in question 1 and 2 are individuals who do not know 
the answer and don’t want to guess.
11  
 
                                                 
11 For this reason a „don’t know“ option was included for all the questions in the questionnaire 2009.   14 
TABLE 1: ANSWERS TO FINANCIAL LITERACY QUESTIONS IN SAVE 2008 
Correct 84.73  % 
Incorrect 10.16  % 
Q1 Interest 
Refuse to answer  5.10 % 
Correct 86.30  % 
Incorrect 8.56% 
Q2 Inflation 
Refuse to answer  5.15 % 
Correct 59.39  % 
Incorrect 3.61  % 
Don’t Know  34.8 % 
Q3 Risk 
Refuse to answer  2.2 % 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted and not imputed. 
 
An analysis of the number of questions correctly answered reveals that only about 
half of the individuals were able to answer all questions. 1% did not answer any of the 
questions correctly.
12 Around 10% of the households gave only one correct answer, 
with about 5% each answering question 1 or 2 correctly and significantly fewer per-
sons answering only question 3 correctly. About 33% gave two correct answers, the 
majority of which answered the first two questions correctly (see table 2). 
 








No question  1,04%    
One Question  10,4%  Question 1  5,07% 
   Question  2  5,03% 
   Question  3  0,3% 
Two Questions  32,53%  Question 1 and 2  26,01% 
    Question 2 and 3  3,82% 
    Question 1 and 3  2,7% 
All three questions  56,02%    
Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted and not imputed. 
 
                                                 
12 I treat missing values as missing, as I do not know for sure, that these individuals did not know the 
answer, due to the lack of the „do not know“ option for questions 1 and 2. This also causes a higher 
measurement error in the financial literacy task as some individuals might have guessed the correct 
answers.    15
Table 3 displays pair-wise Spearman rank correlations between the correct answers 
to the questions. The correlation between correct answers to the first two questions is 
low and not significantly different from 0. This result may seem surprising at first 
glance. As these questions were correctly answered by most of the households the low 
positive correlation indicates that the households who gave an incorrect answer to one 
of the questions did not have a higher probability of answering the other question in-
correctly. Specifically: 82% of the individuals answered both questions correctly and 
1.3% gave wrong answers to both questions. Around 9% gave a correct answer to the 
inflation question and a wrong answer to the interest question and around 8% gave a 
correct answer to the interest question and did not answer the inflation question cor-
rectly. 
The correlation between the interest and the risk as well as the inflation and the 
risk question are significantly larger than zero. This suggests that the probability to 
answer the risk question correctly when the interest or the inflation question has al-
ready been answered correctly is higher and vice versa. In more detail: 58% of the 
individuals gave a correct answer to the interest question and the risk question. How-
ever, 31.5% gave an incorrect answer to the risk question and a correct answer to the 
interest question and only 4.2% gave a correct answer to the risk question while an-
swering the interest question incorrectly. 6.3% gave incorrect answers to both ques-
tions. The pattern of answers for the inflation and the risk question is similar: 59% of 
the individuals answered both questions correctly, 32% gave a correct answer to the 
inflation question but a wrong answer to the risk question and 2.9% answered the risk 
question correctly but not the inflation question. 6% answered both questions incor-
rectly. 
Spearman correlation coefficients between the answers to the three questions and 
the number of correct answers confirm that the risk question was the most difficult to 
answer for participants. The correlation between answering question three correctly 
and the number of correct answers is highest, indicating that the probability to answer 
this question correctly is higher if individuals already got the other questions right 
(see table 3).    16 
TABLE 3: SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS IN PARENTHEIS) 
 Interest  Inflation  Risk 
Interest  1.000    
Inflation  0.0357 
(0.2261)  1,000  
Risk  0.1478 
(0.000) 
0.1772 
(0.000)  1.000 








Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted and not imputed. 
 
Overall, a large fraction the individuals in SAVE (82%) is able to give correct an-
swers to the first two questions. However, correct answers to the risk question are 
substantially lower. Therefore, only 56% of the individuals answered all three ques-
tions correctly. The correlation analysis shows that the probability of giving a correct 
answer to the risk questions increases substantially if correct answers to the interest 
and the inflation question were given.  
 
 
4.2 Who knows a lot and who knows little? 
Bi-variate analysis 
The next question arising is: Who is able to give correct answers to the financial 
literacy questions and who is not? Before analysing the answering behaviour in a 
multivariate context I will first take a look at the bi-variate relationship between an-
swering a particular number of questions correctly and socio-demographic variables. 
The hypothesis 1 put forward was that financial literacy, which is approximated here 
by the number of correctly answered questions, increases with wealth. The first graph 
in the annex shows the number of correct answers over wealth quintiles. A strong 
positive association between wealth and the level of financial literacy can be identi-
fied in the bi-variate context. Only 42% of the households in the bottom wealth-
quintile, i.e. the poorest 20% of the households, give three correct answers, whereas 
73% of the households in the top quintile, i.e. the 20% richest households, answer all 
questions correctly.   17
Hypothesis 2 states that individuals with personal characteristics that lower the cost 
of financial literacy acquisition, for example higher education and higher income, 
show superior levels of financial literacy.  The second and third as well as the fourth 
graph in the annex display the number of correctly answered questions over income-
quintiles and educational status. The share of individuals that are able to give three 
correct answers increases with income, as well as years of schooling and the level of 
occupational education. This confirms that financial literacy is higher for individuals 
with lower cost of financial literacy acquisition. All these variables might be jointly 
influenced by general cognitive abilities. 
Moreover, hypothesis 3 proposes that levels of financial literacy should be lower in 
East Germany than in West Germany all else given, as individuals socialised in the 
GDR are expected to have less experience with individual financial decision making. 
The fifth figure in the annex shows that West Germans indeed answer more questions 
correctly on average. However, this result might be driven by the lower income and 
wealth levels in Eastern Germany and should be analysed in a multi-variate context. 
Furthermore, in hypothesis 4 I expect to find an inverted U-shaped pattern of fi-
nancial literacy over age. This pattern is expected to arise from the trade-off between 
increasing experience and declining cognitive abilities as people grow older. Figure 6 
in the annex shows that the share of individuals who give three correct answers over 
age is indeed hump-shaped. However, taking a closer look at giving a correct answer 
to a particular question depending on age shows that the probability to know the cor-
rect answer to the interest question declines with age, whereas giving a correct answer 
to the inflation question increases with age. Middle aged individuals are most likely to 
give a correct answer to the risk question. Thus, there is no clear hump-shaped pattern 
for the questions separately. The interest question manly requires mathematical capa-
bilities. The decreasing probability to give a correct answer to this question with in-
creasing age might indicate a correlation with cognitive abilities. Giving a correct 
answer to the inflation question might on the other hand be most likely driven by the 
experience of inflationary periods. Thus, individuals that are older and lived during 
periods of high inflation like the 1970s are more likely to give a correct answer. The 
risk question is more frequently answered correctly by middle aged individuals. This 
might also be experience driven. Younger individuals have less frequently invested in 
stocks or mutual funds than middle-aged individuals, probably due to budget restric-
tions. Older individuals might have made important savings decisions before the in-
creasing popularity of stock market participation in the late 1990s and thus also lack 
experience.   18 
The last picture in the annex shows that women on average give fewer correct an-
swers than men (2.37 vs. 2.5 correct answers on average). This pattern has been ob-
served in other countries as well. However, there is no sound theoretical explanation 
for this result. One reason could be that in households with traditional role models 
men are still the main decision makers in the financial domain and thus have higher 
levels of financial literacy. In the multi-variate context I will explicitly control for 
decision making within the household, income-shares of household-members and the 
education status of the partner.   
Multi-variate analysis 
In a next step the overall performance in the financial literacy task can be analysed 
controlling for differences in socio-economic status. I conduct a binary probit of the 
probability to answer all three financial literacy questions correctly on socio-
demographic variables. Table 4 contains the marginal effects of four different specifi-
cations. Most of the independent variables are specified as dummies.  
In the first multivariate regression (model 1) the following associations are identi-
fied: According to hypothesis 1 I expected financial literacy to be associated with 
higher levels of wealth. The logistic regression reveals that while controlling for 
many other socio-economic characteristics the richest 20% of the households answer 
all three questions significantly more frequently. The effects between the first, the 
second, the third and the fourth wealth quintiles show the expected signs, however the 
differences are not statistically significant. As mentioned before, the relationship be-
tween wealth and financial literacy cannot be interpreted in a causal way. 
Moreover, in line with hypothesis 2, table 4 reveals that individuals in higher in-
come quintiles are more likely to give three correct answers. Individuals in the 4
th 
income quintile and individuals in the fifth income quintile have significantly higher 
probabilities to answer all questions correctly compared to individuals in the middle 
of the income distribution. Households with an income below the third income quin-
tile are less likely to give three correct answers. The difference between households in 
the bottom income quintile and the middle of the income distribution is statistically 
significant. 
With respect to education the following results emerge: table 4 shows that lower 
levels of financial literacy are negatively related to low schooling as well as lack of 
vocational training. Having a high school degree (Abitur) compared to intermediate 
schooling (Mittlere Reife) does only have a small and insignificant positive effect. 
Moreover, individuals with a University degree are not significantly more likely to 
give three correct answers than individuals with vocational training. This indicates   19
that with regard to financial literacy, it is important to have a basic level of formal 
training or education, while high(er) levels of education do not necessarily further 
contribute to answering all three questions correctly. 
As opposed to hypothesis 3 and the bi-variate result in the beginning of the chap-
ter, the regressions do not reveal that individuals in East Germany answer fewer ques-
tions correctly than individuals living in West Germany. Thus, the differences found 
in the bi-variate analysis are most likely associated with differences in wealth and 
income.   
Hypothesis 4 states that financial literacy should follow a hump-shaped pattern 
over age. The regression in table 4 appears to substantiate this. However, the differ-
ence between individuals in the section aged between 18 and 34 and those between 35 
and 54 is not statistically significant, whereas older individuals are indeed signifi-
cantly less likely to give three correct answers than individuals in the middle age 
category. This might be related to declining cognitive abilities or a lack of the specific 
knowledge asked for. 
The differences between men and women that were identified in the bi-variate an-
alysis do persist. In the first model, men are significantly (at 1%) more likely to know 
the answers to all three questions compared to women. However, when controlling for 
decision making within the household and income share of the respondent (model 2), 
the coefficient of being male on giving three correct answers is reduced from 0.24 to 
0.18. The effect is only significant at 10% now. Thus, decision making within the 
household explains some of the difference in financial literacy between men and 
women.
13 
Studies for example by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) as well as Bernheim et al.  
(2001) show that financial education prior to working life plays an important role in 
financial knowledge and decision-making. I examine the impact of childhood finan-
cial education and the influence of parental behaviour in model 3 and 4 of table 4. In 
order to examine the impact of financial experience at young ages on financial know-
ledge later in life I include two variables in the regression. The first variable measures 
whether individuals received pocket money on a regular basis. The second variable 
measures if individuals spent the money right away. In addition to this, Lusardi 
(2003) showed that there is a strong impact of parental behavior on financial knowl-
edge and behavior of the offspring. Therefore, I include information on the bookkeep-
                                                 
13 I also conducted a probit regression controlling for the educational degree of the partner and did not 
find a significant effect of the partner’s education on the level of financial literacy, indicating that the 
respondents did not consult their partner, when answering the questionnaire.   20 
ing practices of parents as an indicator of parental saving behavior. The results of the 
probit are displayed in table 4. 
Compared to the specification in model 1, I do not find large changes in the coeffi-
cients due to the inclusion of the additional variables. The variables measuring finan-
cial experience at young age show the expected signs. However, I do not find any 
significant effect of receiving regular pocket money or parents’ bookkeeping practice 
on performance. The negligible effect of including these variables is largely due to the 
fact that receiving pocket money as well as parental behavior is both related to other 
variables like education, income or the level of wealth already included in the regres-
sions.  
   21
TABLE 4: PROBIT SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES ON FINANCIAL LITERACY (COEF.) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Age 18-34 (d)  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.05 
 [0.13]  [0.13]  [0.13]  [0.13] 
Age: 35-54  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref,. 
Age 55 and older (d)  -0.25  -0.26  -0.21  -0.25 
 [0.09]***  [0.09]***  [0.09]*  [0.09]*** 
Men (d)  0.24  0.18  0.24  0.24 
 [0.08]***  [0.09]*  [0.08]***  [0.08]*** 
East (d)  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  -0.02 
 [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.09] 
1
st inc-quintile (d)  -0.26  -0.26  -0.27  -0.26 
 [0.15]*  [0.15]*  [0.14]*  [0.15]* 
2
nd inc-quintile (d)  -0.19  -0.18  -0.19  -0.18 
 [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14] 
3
rd inc-quintile  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
4
th inc-quintile (d)  0.26  0.27  0.25  0.26 
 [0.15]*  [0.15]*  [0.15]*  [0.15]* 
5
th inc-quintile (d)  0.4  0.41  0.38  0.4 
 [0.15]**  [0.15]**  [0.15]**  [0.15]** 
1
st wealth-quintile (d)  -0.2 -0.2 -0.20 -0.2 
 [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14] 
2
nd wealth-quintile (d)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16] 
3
rd wealth-quintile  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
4
th wealth-quintile (d)  0.17  0.18  0.17  0.16 
 [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14] 
5
th wealth-quintile (d)  0.38  0.4  0.37  0.38 
 [0.14]***  [0.14]***  [0.14]**  [0.14]** 
Low schooling (d)  -0.28  -0.29  -0.26  -0.28 
 [0.1]***  [0.10]***  [0.10]**  [0.10]*** 
Intermediate schooling  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
High schooling (d)  0.23  0.23  0.2  0.22 
 [0.14]  [0.14]*  [0.14]  [0.14] 
No vocational training (d)  -0.49  -0.49  -0.48  -0.49 
 [0.13]***  [0.13]***  [0.13]***  [0.13]*** 
Vocational training  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
University degree (d)  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04 
 [0.15]  [0.15]  [0.15]  [0.15] 
Permanently living with a   -0.12  -0.29  -0.11  -0.12 
Partner (d)  [0.10]  [0.14]*  [0.1]  [0.10] 
Decision maker (d)    0.13     
   [0.15]     
Income Share    0.00     
   [0.00]     
Bookkeeping of parents        -0.08 
       [0.11] 
Pocket money regularly      0.02   
     [0.01]   
Spending of pocket money      0.00   
     [0.01]   
N 1198  1198  1198  1198 
  * Standard errors in brackets;  
* sig. at 10%; 
** sig. at 5%; 
*** sig. at 1% 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008 (5 imputed datasets, coefficients 
and standard errors are calculated using Rubin’s procedure (Rubin, 1987)).   22 
 In summary, the results of the analysis of the socio-economic characteristics and 
the performance in the financial literacy task largely support the hypotheses put for-
ward: 
•  Individuals in higher wealth quintiles are more likely to answer all financial 
literacy questions correctly. And vice versa individuals that give three correct 
answers are more likely to be in higher wealth quintiles, which is in line with 
hypothesis 1. 
•  Financial literacy is higher if the costs of information acquisition are lower 
(hypothesis 2), i.e. individuals in higher income quintiles and individuals with 
higher educational and occupational degrees show a higher probability of giv-
ing three correct answers. 
•  Contrary to hypothesis 3 in the multivariate context there are no significant 
differences in the probability to give three correct answers between individu-
als in East and West. Thus, the differences identified in the bi-variate context 
are largely associated with differences in other characteristics, most likely in 
wealth and income. 
•  As proposed by hypothesis 4 the performance in the financial literacy task 
over age resembles a hump-shaped pattern in the bi-variate context. In the 
multivariate context there is a significant and negative effect of being older 
than 55 on the performance in the financial literacy task. 
•  Men have a higher probability than women to answer all three questions cor-
rectly. However, some of the effect disappears when controlling for decision 
making within the household. 
•  The impact of financial experience at younger ages is small. No effect of pa-
rental behaviour can be identified when controlling for all other socio-
demographic differences. 
4.3 How is financial literacy related to retirement savings of 
German households? 
Due to the recent reforms in the German pension system and the resulting increase 
of individuals’ responsibilities for financial planning, it is particularly interesting to 
examine the link between financial literacy and old-age savings. In the course of the 
2001 pension reforms the so-called Riester pensions, state subsidised private pension 
plans, were introduced. Riester pensions are private savings plans, investment funds 
or private pension plans that are subsidised depending on individuals’ income and   23
number of children. Every individual that is mandatorily insured in Germany’s public 
pension system and public servants, as well as their spouses, are eligible for Riester 
plans. For details on the structure of the subsidies, eligibility rules and the dynamics 
of the Riester plans see Börsch-Supan et al. (2007). 
As I am interested in individuals’ saving behavior prior to retirement I restrict the 
analysis to households below the age of 60. Additionally, I restrict the analysis to 
households eligible for Riester subsidies. I exclude single households who are retired 
and households where both partners are retired from the analysis. In addition to the 
retired households I exclude self-employed and non-working households as long as 
they are not unemployed, raising children, doing a civil or military service or obtain-
ing education. Thus, sample size is reduced to 600 households.
14  
The link between financial literacy and old-age savings is difficult to analyse: On 
the one hand, persons with better financial knowledge make better investment deci-
sions and save more because they know more about investment options. On the other 
hand, persons who save a lot deal with financial matters and therefore acquire more 
financial knowledge. Evidence has been found for both directions with the help of 
instrumental variable estimation (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, Monticone, 2009). 
In a first step I analyse the relationship between owning a specific kind of private 
old-age provision and the level of financial literacy, measured as the average number 
of questions answered correctly (Table 5). More than 36% of the individuals eligible 
for a Riester contract in 2008 actually own at least one Riester contract in 2008: 16% 
own a Riester as their only private retirement savings contract, while around 21% 
own a Riester contract in addition to other non-subsidised private savings contracts. 
20% own non-subsidised private old-age savings contracts and no Riester pensions. 
Therefore, around 43% of the households do not own any form of private old-age 
provision. 
In addition to private pension ownership, table 5 displays the average number of 
correctly answered financial literacy questions for households with different forms of 
private old-age provision. Households with private old-age provision on average give 
about 2.6 correct answers, households without only 2.25. Furthermore, households 
who only have a Riester contract and no non-subsidised private old-age provision are 
slightly less literate than households who either only have non-subsidised forms of 
private old-age provision or have a Riester contract in addition to non-subsidised pri-
vate old-age provision.  
                                                 
14 I keep households in the sample that own a Riester contract but would not be eligible in 2008.   24 
I conduct t-tests of equal means for all categories in table 5: The hypothesis that 
the average number of correctly answered questions is equal across the four catego-
ries can be rejected at 0.1% significance level for comparisons between the house-
holds without any private old-age provision and all the other categories. The hypothe-
sis that households who only have a Riester contract and households who have either 
non-subsidised private old-age provision only or other contracts in addition to the 
Riester contract answer an equal number of financial literacy questions correctly is 
rejected at the 10% significance level. Given that households have other non-
subsidised private old-age provision the ownership of a Riester contract is not associ-
ated with higher financial literacy: The hypothesis that the means between categories 
3 and 4 are identical cannot be rejected.  
TABLE 5: PRIVATE OLD-AGE PROVISION AND FINANCIAL LITERACY 
 Relative  Frequency 
Average number of 
correctly answered 
questions 
No private old-age provision  43.25% 2.25 
Riester  15,97% 2.47 
Non-subsidised private old-
age provision  20.16 %  2.65 
Riester and non-subsidised 
private old-age provision  20,62 %  2.64 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted and imputed. 
In summary, households that are more literate are more likely to save privately for 
their old-age and at the same time households saving privately for their old-age ac-
quire financial knowledge to improve their investment decision. Also, the possession 
of a Riester contract is associated with lower levels of financial literacy than the pos-
session of other non-subsidised forms of private old-age provision. This indicates that 
Riester subsidies are to some extend successfully reaching individuals with lower 
financial knowledge.  
Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) find that in the lowest income quintile Riester pensions 
coverage is still quite low but experiences a high dynamic over time, however, they 
identify a higher coverage of families with children. In a next step I will analyse how 
this is related to financial knowledge. 
Table 6 compares the relative frequencies of private old-age provision and the av-
erage number of correctly answered financial literacy questions over income quin-
tiles. First of all, it is notable that the average number of correctly answered questions 
increases with income in all categories of old-age provision. Furthermore, in all in-
come quintiles except for the second, the average number of correctly answered ques-  25
tions is lowest for households without any private old-age provision. Moreover, the 
share of individuals without private old-age provision decreases from 67 percent in 
the lowest income quintile to around 18 percent in the highest income quintile. How-
ever, the share of households with only a Riester contract is somewhat hump-shaped 
over the income quintiles. It is highest for households in the middle of the income 
distribution. Households in the higher income quintiles are more likely to own non-
subsidised forms of private old-age provision either only or in addition to a Riester 
contract. These results indicate that the incentives created by the Riester contracts are 
most effective for households in the middle of the income distribution. However, the 
coverage in the lowest income quintile is still below 20%. Almost 70% of these 
households do not save for their old-age. Thus, despite the high subsidy for house-
holds with low incomes
15 these households do not save.  
TABLE 6: PRIVATE OLD-AGE PROVISION AND FINANCIAL LITERACY BY INCOME QUINTILES 
  Average number of correctly answered questions 
(relative frequency in %) 


























































Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted, and imputed. 
Bernheim (1997a, 1997b) argues convincingly that it is important to distinguish 
between individuals that actively choose not to save due to their preferences and indi-
viduals that save too little to meet their own objective or even fail to form an objec-
tive due to the inability to calculate correctly. The low old-age saving in the lowest 
income quintile might on the one hand reflect reluctance to buy an old-age savings 
contract due to scepticism and lack of knowledge. On the other hand it might express 
personal preference: households might not save due to budget limitations or save in 
more liquid forms due to being close to the budget restriction. However, table 6 also 
indicates that the households in the lowest income quintile overall show the lowest 
number of correctly answered financial literacy questions. To investigate a little fur-
ther upon this point I conduct probit regressions of socio-demographic variables as 
well as financial literacy on the ownership of private old-age provision contracts.  
                                                 
15 The minimum contribution rate is 4% of the income including the subsidy and at least 60 € per year 
to obtain full subsidies of currently 154 €.   26 
The results of the probit regressions displayed in table 7 and 8 reveal several inter-
esting aspects. The first three columns of table 7 contain the three most basic models. 
•  First of all, financial literacy shows a significantly positive relation with 
owning any kind of private old-age provision (column 1). Furthermore, fi-
nancial literacy shows a positive relation to the ownership of non-subsidised 
private old-age provision, significant at 10% (column 2). Additionally, fi-
nancial literacy is positively but insignificantly associated with the owner-
ship of a Riester contract (column 3).
16  
•  The ownership of non-subsidised private old-age provision is positively re-
lated to the ownership of a Riester contract and vice versa (column 2 and 
column 3). Thus, households sensitive to the topic of old-age provision are 
more likely to have both one and the other.   
•  Overall, younger individuals are not more likely to own private old-age pro-
vision. Even though it is more important for them to take individual care of 
their old-age income. However, younger individuals are more likely to have 
a Riester, but they are not more likely to have non-subsidised old-age provi-
sion. This result stems largely from the fact that Riester has only been intro-
duced in 2001 and many of the older households might already have se-
lected other contracts before Riester subsidies were available. 
•  Education does make a difference when it comes to owning private old-age 
provision in general: Individuals with high school degree are more likely 
and individuals without any vocational training are less likely to own such 
contracts. However, when analysing the ownership of Riester contracts in 
particular, there is no difference in the likelihood to own one across educa-
tional attainments.  
•  Furthermore, the number of children is positively related to Riester owner-
ship. This is not surprising as Riester offers large additional lump sum sub-
sidies for families with children. 
•  Living with a partner has a significant positive impact on owning any kind 
of old-age provision. The reason is that in this specification I do not account 
for income or wealth of the household. However, two earner households are 
richer and thus more likely to own some old-age provision. 
                                                 
16 The insignificance is largely due to the small sample size. The results become significant if sample 
size is increased by including the households of the access panel. However, whether the two samples 
can be pooled requires a deeper examination.   27
In column 4 to 6 income was added to the regressions. The following changes in 
the results can be noted: 
•  Even when accounting for income, financial literacy is significantly and 
positively related to the ownership of any kind of private old-age provision 
(column 4). However, when analysing the ownership of non-subsidised pri-
vate old-age provision and Riester contracts separately, no effect of financial 
literacy can be detected. 
•  As expected the impact of living with a partner is reduced. 
•  Households belonging to the lowest 20% of the income distribution show a 
significantly lower probability of owning subsidised as well as non-
subsidised private old-age provision. 
•  The ownership of any kind of old-age provision (column 4) and the owner-
ship of non-subsidised old-age provision in particular (column 5) increase 
over income.  
•  The probability to own a Riester contract is hump-shaped over income: the 
coefficients all have a negative sign compared to being in the middle of the 
income distribution. However, only the coefficients of the two lower income 
quintiles are significant. 
Adding interaction effects between financial literacy and being in a certain slice of 
the income distribution does not change the results substantially (table 8).  
Financial literacy does have a positive but insignificant association with owning 
any kind of old-age provision or non-subsidised old-age provision over most of the 
income quintiles (it is negative but insignificant in the second income quintile).  
The relation between owning a Riester contract and higher financial literacy is 
mixed over the income quintiles. The interaction terms show a positive but insignifi-
cant coefficient in the first and the third quintile, while the coefficient in the fourth 
income quintile is positive and significant. However, the sign of the coefficient is 
negative but insignificant in the second and the fifth income quintile.    28 
 
TABLE 7: PROBIT FINANCIAL LITERACY ON PRIVATE OLD-AGE PROVISION (COEFF.)  

















0.42  0.25  0.19 0.33 0.16  0.15 
 [0.13]***  [0.13]*  [0.13] [0.13]** [0.13]  [0.13] 
Riester (d)    0.39     0.35   
   [0.12]***     [0.13]**   
other private old-
age provision (d) 
    0.41     0.36 
     [0.12]***     [0.13]*** 
Age 0.07  0.00  0.11 0.03 -0.04  0.09 
 [0.05]  [0.02]  [0.05]** [0.06]  [0.06]  [0.05]* 
Age ^2  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 0.00  -0.00 
 [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]** [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]** 
Men (d)  -0.18  0.00  -0.3 -0.19  -0.02  -0.30 
 [0.12]  [0.12]  [0.12]** [0.13]  [0.13]  [0.12]** 
East (d)  -0.08  -0.37  -0.04 0.10 -0.19  0.05 
 [0.13]  [0.13]***  [0.13] [0.14] [0.14]  [0.14] 
Low schooling 
(d) 
0.11  -0.07  0.01 0.19 0.00  0.04 
 [0.15]  [0.15]  [0.15] [0.15] [0.15]  [0.15] 
Intermediate 
schooling 
Ref.  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref. 
High schooling 
(d) 
0.5  0.4  0.18 0.5 0.40  0.21 
 [0.18]***  [0.17]**  [0.17] [0.18]***  [0.18]**  [0.17] 
No vocational 
training (d) 
-0.71  -1.17  -0.16 -0.63 -1.09  -0.1 
 [0.19]***  [0.23]***  [0.20] [0.22]***  [0.23]***  [0.20] 
Vocational trai-
ning 
Ref.  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref. 
University degree 
(d) 
-0.05  -0.05  0.18 -0.20 -0.19  -0.14 
 [0.22]  [0.21]  [0.17] [0.22] [0.21]  [0.2] 
Living with a 
partner 
0.71  0.57  0.41 0.4 0.29  0.25 
 [0.13]***  [0.14]***  [0.13]*** [0.15]**  [0.16]*  [0.15] 
Anzahl Kinder  0.08  -0.05  0.14 0.04 -0.08  0.14 
 [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.05]*** [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.05]*** 
     -0.66  -0.47  -0.55  1
st income quinti-
le (d)       [0.21]***  [0.20]**  [0.21]** 
     -0.28  -0.05  -0.34  2
nd income quin-
tile (d)       [0.21]  [0.21]  [0.2]* 
3
rd income  
quintile 
     Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
     0.14  0.20  -0.31  4
th income quinti-
le (d)       [0.22]  [0.19]  [0.2] 
     0.25  0.5  -0.1  5
th incomen quin-
tile (d)       [0.21]  [0.19]**  [0.19] 
Observations 600  600  600 600 600  600 
  
* Standard errors in brackets;  
* sig. at 10%; 
** sig. at 5%; 
*** sig. at 1% 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008 (5 imputed datasets, coefficients 
and standard errors are calculated using Rubin’s procedure (Rubin, 1987)). 
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TABLE 8: PROBIT FINANCIAL LITERACY ON PRIVATE OLD-AGE PROVISION (COEFF.)  





Riester (d)    0.33   
   [0.13]**   
other private old-age provision (d)    0.34 
     [0.13]** 
Age 0.03  -0.05  0.09 
 [0.06]  [0.06]  [0.05]* 
Age ^2  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
 [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]** 
Men (d)  -0.18  -0.01  -0.28 
 [0.13]  [0.13]  [0.12]** 
East (d)  0.12  -0.17  0.06 
 [0.14]  [0.14]  [0.14] 
Low schooling (d)  0.19  0.00  0.05 
 [0.15]  [0.15]  [0.16] 
Intermediate schooling  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
High schooling (d)  0.50  0.39  0.20 
 [0.18]**  [0.18]**  [0.17] 
No vocational training (d)  -0.63  -1.10  -0.12 
 [0.2]***  [0.23]***  [0.20] 
Vocational training  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
University degree (d)  -0.2  -0.19  -0.14 
 [0.22]  [0.22]  [0.20] 
Living with a partner  0.40  0.29  0.26 
 [0.15]**  [0.16]*  [0.15]* 
Anzahl Kinder  0.04  -0.08  0.14 
 [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.05]*** 
1
st income quintile (d)  -0.7  -0.5  -0.6 
 [0.29]**  [0.29]*  [0.3]* 
2
nd income quintile (d)  -0.19  0.09  -0.13 
 [0.29]  [0.31]  [0.30] 
3
rd income quintile  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
4
th income quintile (d)  -0.10  0.07  -0.58 
 [0.36]  [0.34]  [0.35] 
5
th income quintile (d)  0.23  0.44  0.15 
 [0.37]  [0.34]  [0.35] 
Financia Literacy * 1 Inc_Q  0.35  0.21  0.27 
 [0.23]  [0.25]  [0.24] 
Financia Literacy * 2 Inc_Q  0.08  -0.12  -0.24 
 [0.29]  [0.28]  [0.28] 
Financia Literacy * 3 Inc_Q  0.28  0.16  0.17 
 [0.3]  [0.28]  [0.28] 
Financia Literacy * 4 Inc_Q  0.70  0.36  0.55 
 [0.35]*  [0.30]  [0.31]* 
Financia Literacy * 5 Inc_Q  0.32  0.25  -0.15 
 [0.35]  [0.31]  [0.30] 
Observations 600  600  600 
 
* Standard errors in brackets;  
* sig. at 10%; 
** sig. at 5%; 
*** sig. at 1% 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008 (5 imputed datasets, coefficients 
and standard errors are calculated using Rubin’s procedure (Rubin, 1987)). 
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Finally, the answers to the questions raised above can be given: 
1.  Are higher levels of financial literacy associated with more private pension 
coverage? Overall, the analysis shows that the correlation between financial 
literacy and any form of private provision is positive even when controlling 
for differences in education and income.  
2.  However, the correlation between financial literacy and ownership of private 
old-age provision is much stronger in the case of non-subsidised private pro-
vision than for Riester savers. On the one hand, this implies that Riester sub-
sidies encourage households with lower financial literacy to engage in pri-
vate old-age provision. On the other hand, this might mean that households 
with a Riester contract think less about their decision and thus accumulated 
less financial knowledge in the decision process. If this is indeed the case, 
providing for a state subsidy is not enough to improve the decision making 
of households. The simplification of products and market structures, reliable 
recommendations from independent advisors and enhancing individuals’ fi-
nancial knowledge can play important roles in stoking individuals awareness 
for the necessity to care for old-age and reduce possible mistakes.  
3.  Furthermore, provision in the lowest income quintile is still lower than in 
the rest of the population. Thus, more effort is needed to encourage private 
retirement savings among households with low income and wealth. Provid-
ing for a state subsidy is obviously not enough to encourage the poorest 
households, who also show the lowest degree of financial knowledge, to en-
gage in old-age savings. 
5.  Conclusion 
In summary, the German population has good financial knowledge measured on 
the basis of three financial literacy questions. Around 85 percent of the individuals 
comprehend the functioning of interest and inflation. Around 60% of the individuals 
understand the relationship of risk and diversification. Overall around 52% of the 
individuals were able to give three correct answers. Bi-variate and multivariate analy-
ses of the relation between giving three correct answers and socio-demographic char-
acteristics reveal that higher wealth is indeed associated with higher levels of finan-
cial literacy. This confirms the notion by Peress (2004) that individuals with higher 
wealth have higher incentives to invest in the accumulation of financial knowledge   31
and at the same time financial knowledge improves decisions and therefore the payoff 
from investments which increases wealth. Moreover, it was found that financial liter-
acy is related to higher levels of income and education. Thus, households with lower 
cost of financial literacy acquisition have a higher level of knowledge. No significant 
difference in the probability to give three correct answers was found between indi-
viduals in East and West after controlling for education, income and wealth. How-
ever, men are more likely than women to answer all three questions correctly. This 
effect is diminished when controlling for decision-making within the household. 
A positive relationship between financial literacy and retirement saving decisions 
is identified: more literate households are more likely to save privately for their old-
age and at the same time households saving privately for their old-age acquire finan-
cial knowledge to improve their investment decisions. The possession of a Riester 
contract is related to lower levels of financial literacy than the possession of other 
forms of private old-age provision, indicating that Riester subsidies are to some extent 
successful at attracting individuals with lower financial knowledge. Nevertheless, 
individuals in the lowest income quintile still have very low levels of private coverage 
despite receiving the highest subsidies. At the same time they show the lowest levels 
of financial literacy. The financial incentives provided by Riester target exactly those 
individuals at risk of having low financial literacy and therefore not saving ade-
quately. However, the analysis conducted above indicates that more effort is needed 
in the lower income quintiles. Particularly, as these individuals are at risk of receiving 
low public pensions due to low contributions. 
Most scholars examining financial literacy argue that more financial education is 
needed to enhance individuals’ financial knowledge and thereby their willingness to 
save. According to the association of German banks (Bankenverband, 2008) more 
than 80% of the individuals in the survey would appreciate improved economic edu-
cation in school. However, the effects of financial education on decision making be-
havior are mixed and a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of financial education 
programs is lacking so far (OECD, 2008). Before introducing economics courses into 
school curricula it is necessary to examine possible alternatives and carefully compare 
the success as well as the cost of potential measures to improve individuals’ ability. 
The analysis above suggests that the subsidies provided by Riester successfully en-
courage certain groups in the middle of the income distribution and with moderate 
levels of financial literacy. However, the poorest 20% of the households still do not 
respond to the policy measures. Thus, more effort is needed here. Instead of investing 
in general economics courses in school, it would probably be more efficient to target 
specific groups at risk.   32 
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TABLE: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAVE RANDOM ROUTE SAMPLE 2008 
Variable  Share in % 
Male 46.0  Gender 
Female 54.0 
West 64.7  Region 
East 35.3 
Yes 62.7  Living with a partner 
No 37.3 
younger than 35  19.3 
35-54 39 
Age 
55 and older  41.7 
1.000€ and below  21.6 
1.000 to 2.000€  38.6 
2.000 to 3000 €  22.8 
Income 





No occupational training  16.0 
Vocational training  68.6 
Occupational training 
University degree  15.4 
* Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted and imputed 
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three financial literacy questions... 
 
 




Source: Own calculation on the basis of SAVE 2008, Note: data is weighted and imputed   38 
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